cover
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
Bashtool to perform framework discovery, execute test suites (e.g., vitest, jest, pytest), and manage containerized services viadocker composeortestcontainers. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Uses the
CronCreatetool to establish a persistent "Coverage Drift Monitor" that periodically executes shell commands to track coverage regressions, which persists the agent's activity across sessions. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Implements a
PreToolUsehook that executes an external script (run-hook.mjs) through the shell, allowing for arbitrary code execution whenever theBashtool is invoked. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The "Heal Loop" workflow (Phase 5) creates a surface for indirect prompt injection by reading potentially untrusted source code and test logs to generate fixes.
- Ingestion points: Phase 5 reads project source code and test execution results from the file system.
- Boundary markers: There are no defined delimiters or instructions provided to the generator agents to distinguish between the code being tested and the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses powerful capabilities including
Bash,Write,Edit, andCronCreatethat could be exploited if malicious instructions are processed. - Sanitization: No evidence of input validation or sanitization exists for the content ingested from the project environment before it is passed to sub-agents.
Audit Metadata