code-review-playbook
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instruction file
scripts/review-pr.mddirects the agent to execute shell commands using user-supplied input (e.g.,gh pr view $ARGUMENTS). The instructions do not specify sanitization or quoting for the$ARGUMENTSvariable, which could allow a malicious user to perform command injection by providing arguments containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,123; malicious_command). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates an indirect prompt injection surface in
scripts/review-pr.mdby retrieving and processing untrusted data from external pull requests. - Ingestion points: Untrusted content is fetched from GitHub pull request titles, descriptions, diffs, and comments using
gh pr viewandgh pr diffcommands. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not provide delimiters or instructions to the agent to treat the fetched PR content as potentially hostile or untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to powerful tools including
Bash,Read,Grep,WebFetch, andWebSearch, which could be exploited if the agent follows malicious instructions embedded in a pull request. - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is performed on the external data before it is presented to the agent's context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes dynamic context injection (the
!command`` syntax) withinscripts/review-pr.mdto execute shell commands such asgit branch --show-currentandgh pr listat the moment the skill is loaded. While these specific commands are used for context gathering in a developer environment, they represent automated execution of shell logic upon accessing the skill.
Audit Metadata