coco-cli

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill documentation instructs the user/agent to run ./scripts/install.sh or ./scripts/install.ps1 to set up the environment. Because these script files are not included in the provided context, their actions cannot be audited, posing a risk of arbitrary code execution, privilege escalation, or malicious system configuration during installation.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (HIGH): The skill relies on an external 'coco' CLI binary. The installation scripts mentioned in the README likely download this binary from a remote server. Without a verified source URL or checksum, this represents a risk of downloading and executing untrusted or malicious software.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (MEDIUM): This skill defines a significant attack surface by processing external ODB++ design files.
  • Ingestion points: Files within the directory structure provided to the --input flag (e.g., matrix/, steps/, misc/).
  • Boundary markers: None. The tool processes folder contents directly.
  • Capability inventory: The skill executes a CLI tool with numerous subcommands (list-layers, measure, render) that handle local file system paths.
  • Sanitization: None described. Maliciously crafted PCB design files could potentially exploit vulnerabilities in the proprietary coco parser.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 12:55 PM