continuous-learning-v2
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it analyzes session logs containing untrusted tool outputs to generate behavioral patterns. Ingestion point: Session logs in
observations.jsonlare populated by thehooks/observe.shscript with raw tool results. Boundary markers: The observer agent's prompt inagents/observer-loop.shlacks delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the processed log content. Capability inventory: The observer agent has the ability to write new behavioral 'instinct' files to the filesystem. Sanitization: Logged tool outputs are truncated but not sanitized for embedded instructions. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill captures tool inputs and outputs during sessions, creating a local log of interactions that is subsequently processed by an external LLM.
hooks/observe.shrecords tool activity toobservations.jsonl. While intended for learning, this can lead to the logging and transmission of sensitive data (like secrets or code) to the LLM provider if they appear in tool outputs. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/instinct-cli.pyutility allows users to import instinct definitions from arbitrary remote URLs via theimportcommand. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill manages background processes and executes system utilities.
agents/start-observer.shspawns a background analysis loop usingnohup.agents/observer-loop.shexecutes theclaudeCLI tool to process observations.
Audit Metadata