catalog-porter

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 3, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a git clone command using a user-provided URL without sufficient sanitization or the use of the -- separator. This allows for argument injection attacks (e.g., using --upload-pack) that can lead to arbitrary code execution.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: In Phase 5 (Validation), the skill runs bun run build:index, bun run validate, and bun test. Because these commands are executed after external files have been cloned and copied into the local repository, a malicious upstream repository could include files (like configuration files or test scripts) that execute arbitrary code during the validation phase.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes the content of untrusted SKILL.md files from external repositories to perform classification and porting tasks.
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads all SKILL.md files found in the cloned repository (Phase 1, Step 7).
  • Boundary markers: There are no specified boundary markers or instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands within the processed files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities including network operations (git clone), filesystem write access (catalog/skills/), and shell command execution (bun test, rm -rf).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the external markdown or frontmatter is performed before it is analyzed or integrated into the local catalog.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 3, 2026, 03:50 PM