catalog-porter
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 3, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a
git clonecommand using a user-provided URL without sufficient sanitization or the use of the--separator. This allows for argument injection attacks (e.g., using--upload-pack) that can lead to arbitrary code execution. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: In Phase 5 (Validation), the skill runs
bun run build:index,bun run validate, andbun test. Because these commands are executed after external files have been cloned and copied into the local repository, a malicious upstream repository could include files (like configuration files or test scripts) that execute arbitrary code during the validation phase. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes the content of untrusted
SKILL.mdfiles from external repositories to perform classification and porting tasks. - Ingestion points: The agent reads all
SKILL.mdfiles found in the cloned repository (Phase 1, Step 7). - Boundary markers: There are no specified boundary markers or instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands within the processed files.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities including network operations (
git clone), filesystem write access (catalog/skills/), and shell command execution (bun test,rm -rf). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the external markdown or frontmatter is performed before it is analyzed or integrated into the local catalog.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata