elevenlabs-remotion
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The
generate.jsscript is designed to read theELEVENLABS_API_KEYfrom a local.env.localfile. This represents programmatic access to sensitive user credentials. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
generate.jsscript usesexecSyncto invokeffmpegandffprobebinaries. It interpolates file paths and scene metadata directly into shell command strings. Since these paths can be sourced from user-provided CLI arguments or potentially untrustedscenes.jsonfiles, this creates a vector for command injection on the host system. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
CLAUDE.mdfile defines a workflow where the agent usesWebFetchto scrape external websites to extract design tokens. This process exposes the agent to indirect prompt injection, as malicious website content could contain instructions intended to override agent behavior. - Ingestion points: External URLs accessed via
WebFetchduring the Design Extraction Workflow inCLAUDE.md. - Boundary markers: None specified for the content retrieved from external URLs.
- Capability inventory: The agent has permission to use
node,npx,ffprobe, andffmpegvia the Bash tool. - Sanitization: The skill documentation does not describe any sanitization or validation logic for data ingested from the web.
Audit Metadata