beadboard-driver

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it directs the agent to ingest and act upon data from project-level files and task notes.
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads the Environment Status Cache from project.md (Step 0) and task context from bd show (Step 4).
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat this external data as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands, install software, and modify project files.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or schema validation performed on the contents of the project.md file before it is processed by the agent.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill automates the installation of the BeadBoard coordination system by cloning its repository from GitHub and installing the beads-cli package from the NPM registry. These resources are authored by the skill's vendor.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several utility scripts use spawnSync and execFile to invoke CLI tools for environment setup and coordination. Notably, it configures a mail delegate in the bd tool which executes a local shim script to handle agent communications.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the installation and execution of external code through global NPM package installation and repository cloning as part of its initialization and execution runbook.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 6, 2026, 02:02 PM