docx
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (HIGH): Vulnerability to Zip Slip in
ooxml/scripts/unpack.py. - Evidence: The script uses
zipfile.ZipFile(input_file).extractall(output_path)without validating that the filenames inside the ZIP archive do not contain path traversal sequences (e.g.,../../). - Impact: A maliciously crafted .docx, .pptx, or .xlsx file could overwrite sensitive files (like
.bashrcor application code) on the agent's filesystem when processed. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): Unsafe system command invocation in
ooxml/scripts/pack.py. - Evidence: The
validate_documentfunction executessubprocess.run(["soffice", ...])to convert documents to HTML. - Impact: While the use of a list for arguments prevents basic shell injection, the execution of complex external binaries on untrusted inputs increases the attack surface of the agent environment.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION] (INFO): The skill handles potentially sensitive documents.
- Observation: The skill is designed to unpack, modify, and repack Office documents. While no active exfiltration was detected, the lack of path sanitization during unpacking is the primary risk factor for data integrity and system security.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): Vulnerability via untrusted data ingestion.
- Ingestion points:
ooxml/scripts/unpack.pyaccepts external Office files from the agent context. - Boundary markers: None. The skill extracts all contents of the zip archive directly.
- Capability inventory:
zipfile.extractall(write),shutil.copytree(write),subprocess.run(execute). - Sanitization: Uses
defusedxmlfor XML parsing (safe), but lacks path validation for file extraction (unsafe).
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata