internal-comms
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): Indirect Prompt Injection vulnerability surface detected across multiple guideline files.
- Ingestion points: The files
examples/3p-updates.md,examples/company-newsletter.md, andexamples/faq-answers.mdexplicitly instruct the agent to gather data from external, untrusted sources including Slack messages, Google Drive documents, Emails, and Calendar events. - Boundary markers: The skill fails to provide any delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious commands embedded within the fetched data (e.g., a Slack message containing a hidden instruction to leak data).
- Capability inventory: Although the skill itself contains no code, it utilizes the agent's broad read/write capabilities across enterprise tools to aggregate and summarize information.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the content retrieved from external tools before it is processed by the LLM and presented to the user.
Audit Metadata