mcp-builder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (LOW): The
scripts/connections.pyfile contains theMCPConnectionStdioclass, which uses themcplibrary to spawn subprocesses using arbitrary commands and arguments. While this is the intended mechanism for MCP stdio servers, it provides a high-privilege execution capability that could be targeted by an attacker. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (LOW): The
SKILL.mdfile directs the agent to fetch documentation frommodelcontextprotocol.ioand GitHub. These are non-whitelisted external sources used to provide context for the agent's tasks. - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) due to the combination of external data ingestion and powerful tool capabilities.
- Ingestion points: External markdown documentation is fetched from the web as part of the implementation workflow.
- Boundary markers: None; the skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the fetched documentation.
- Capability inventory: The
connections.pyscript enables local command execution viastdioand network communication viaSSEandHTTPtransports. - Sanitization: None; there is no evidence of sanitization or content validation for the externally retrieved documentation.
Audit Metadata