notebooklm
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- Unverifiable Dependencies (MEDIUM): The skill depends on
patchright, an anti-detection browser automation library. This package and its associated browser binaries are downloaded from non-trusted sources during the setup process. - Evidence:
requirements.txtspecifiespatchright==1.55.2.scripts/setup_environment.pyexecutespatchright install chromevia subprocess. - Remote Code Execution (MEDIUM): The skill performs runtime installation of packages and execution of scripts through a custom wrapper. While intended for environment isolation, this pattern involves executing code downloaded at runtime.
- Evidence:
scripts/run.pyandscripts/setup_environment.pyusesubprocess.runto callpip installand execute other Python scripts in the.venv. - Indirect Prompt Injection (LOW): The skill ingests untrusted data from Google NotebookLM and uses it to decide if follow-up actions are needed. Maliciously crafted documents could attempt to influence the agent's logic during the synthesis phase.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/ask_question.pyextracts text from the NotebookLM UI (RESPONSE_SELECTORS). - Boundary markers: None. The answer text is returned to the agent without delimiters or safety instructions.
- Capability inventory: File writing (
library.json,auth_info.json), network access via browser automation, and subprocess execution viarun.py. - Sanitization: None detected. Output is raw text from the browser session.
- Command Execution (LOW): The skill relies heavily on
subprocessto manage its internal lifecycle and environment, which is a common but sensitive capability. - Evidence:
scripts/__init__.py,scripts/run.py, andscripts/setup_environment.pyall use thesubprocessmodule to manage the virtual environment.
Audit Metadata