notebooklm

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • Unverifiable Dependencies (MEDIUM): The skill depends on patchright, an anti-detection browser automation library. This package and its associated browser binaries are downloaded from non-trusted sources during the setup process.
  • Evidence: requirements.txt specifies patchright==1.55.2. scripts/setup_environment.py executes patchright install chrome via subprocess.
  • Remote Code Execution (MEDIUM): The skill performs runtime installation of packages and execution of scripts through a custom wrapper. While intended for environment isolation, this pattern involves executing code downloaded at runtime.
  • Evidence: scripts/run.py and scripts/setup_environment.py use subprocess.run to call pip install and execute other Python scripts in the .venv.
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (LOW): The skill ingests untrusted data from Google NotebookLM and uses it to decide if follow-up actions are needed. Maliciously crafted documents could attempt to influence the agent's logic during the synthesis phase.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/ask_question.py extracts text from the NotebookLM UI (RESPONSE_SELECTORS).
  • Boundary markers: None. The answer text is returned to the agent without delimiters or safety instructions.
  • Capability inventory: File writing (library.json, auth_info.json), network access via browser automation, and subprocess execution via run.py.
  • Sanitization: None detected. Output is raw text from the browser session.
  • Command Execution (LOW): The skill relies heavily on subprocess to manage its internal lifecycle and environment, which is a common but sensitive capability.
  • Evidence: scripts/__init__.py, scripts/run.py, and scripts/setup_environment.py all use the subprocess module to manage the virtual environment.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:20 PM