create-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes untrusted data (file contents and git diffs) to generate documentation and pull request descriptions.
- Ingestion points: Reads output from
git diff,git status, and the content ofSKILL.mdfiles across the repository. - Boundary markers: None identified; the agent is not instructed to ignore instructions embedded within the files it analyzes.
- Capability inventory: Includes file modification (
Write,Edittools), command execution (Bash), and remote repository interaction (ghCLI). - Sanitization: No validation or filtering is performed on the data ingested from files before it is used to generate documentation or PR metadata.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The workflow utilizes
git add .followed bygit push. This stages all modified or untracked files in the working directory. If sensitive files (e.g.,.envfiles, local logs, or credentials) are present and not properly managed via.gitignore, they may be inadvertently committed and uploaded to a remote repository. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on several system commands executed via the
Bashtool, includinggit,gh(GitHub CLI), andln. While these are required for the skill's stated purpose of creating pull requests, they represent a significant capability tier that could be exploited if the agent is influenced by malicious input.
Audit Metadata