xiaohongshu
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 18, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE] (HIGH): The script
scripts/start-mcp.shcopies the user's Xiaohongshu session cookies from home directories to/tmp/cookies.json. On most Linux systems,/tmpis globally readable, making these sensitive session credentials accessible to any other user or process on the machine. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): Documentation recommends downloading binaries and cloning repositories from untrusted sources (
xpzouying/xiaohongshu-mcpandJoeanAmier/XHS-Downloader). These external dependencies are not from trusted organizations and are executed with user permissions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): Several scripts, including
scripts/mcp-call.shandscripts/comment.sh, interpolate user-controlled variables directly into double-quoted shell strings that are then passed tocurl. Because shell expansion occurs within these strings, characters like backticks or dollar signs in Xiaohongshu post content could trigger arbitrary command execution. - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The
scripts/track-topic.pyscript aggregates content from Xiaohongshu into reports. This creates an indirect prompt injection surface where external, untrusted content could include instructions designed to manipulate the AI agent's behavior. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The
scripts/track-topic.pyscript dynamically locates and executes scripts from other skills based on computed paths, which could lead to unauthorized code execution if a malicious skill is placed in the expected path.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata