skills/zircote/.claude/xlsx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

xlsx

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill processes untrusted external data (Excel files) and possesses both file-write and command-execution capabilities.
  • Ingestion points: The filename argument in recalc.py allows the agent to process any Excel file provided by a user or external source.
  • Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore embedded macros or malicious content within the spreadsheet.
  • Capability inventory: The script executes subprocess.run(['soffice', ...]) to launch LibreOffice and uses the macro to call ThisComponent.store(), which writes changes back to the disk.
  • Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is performed on the Excel content before it is processed by the office suite.
  • Dynamic Execution (MEDIUM): The script recalc.py dynamically generates a LibreOffice Basic macro (Module1.xba) and writes it to the user's application configuration directory (~/.config/libreoffice/ or ~/Library/Application Support/LibreOffice/) before triggering its execution.
  • Command Execution (MEDIUM): The skill spawns external processes including soffice, timeout, and gtimeout. While it uses list-based arguments for subprocess.run, it relies on the presence and security of system-level binaries to handle untrusted file inputs.
  • Persistence Mechanisms (MEDIUM): By writing a macro to the standard LibreOffice configuration path, the skill creates a persistent executable artifact on the host system that remains after the specific task is completed.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 06:47 AM