latex-table-generator
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill processes untrusted external content and uses it to generate file output without sanitization.
- Ingestion points: The skill uses
pdf-tools-read_pdf_pagesandpdf-tools-search_pdf_contentto extract data from external sources as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are provided to help the agent distinguish between valid data and embedded instructions in the source documents.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
filesystem-write_fileto save the generated LaTeX code directly to the local filesystem. - Sanitization: There is no logic or instruction to sanitize or escape LaTeX special characters or dangerous commands like
\write18or\input. This could allow an attacker to craft a PDF that, when processed, results in a.texfile that executes arbitrary shell commands or exfiltrates data when the user attempts to compile it. - Data Exposure (MEDIUM): The combination of
filesystem-list_directoryandpdf-tools-read_pdf_pagesprovides broad access to the filesystem, which could be exploited via injection to read sensitive documents outside the intended scope.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata