skills/zpankz/mcp-skillset/bd/Gen Agent Trust Hub

bd

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [Data Exposure] (LOW): The installation instructions in INSTALLATION.md contain hardcoded local file paths belonging to a specific user account ('mikhail'). While likely intended as placeholders for the user to substitute, they reveal internal directory structures and user information.
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The skill processes untrusted external data such as issue titles, descriptions, and comments (ingested via bd list, bd search, and bd status). This represents a vulnerability surface where an attacker-controlled issue could influence the agent's behavior if the agent is instructed to act based on issue content.
  • Ingestion points: Issue data retrieved from the .beads/ directory via the bd binary.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or 'ignore instructions' warnings are mentioned in the documentation for handling issue content.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can execute bd commands and the included issue-validator.sh script, which possesses file-system write and delete capabilities (e.g., removing database files in --fix mode).
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or escaping of external issue content before processing is found in the provided scripts.
  • [Persistence Mechanisms] (LOW): The bd hooks install command referenced in the documentation installs git hooks (pre-commit and post-commit) into the local repository. This mechanism ensures the bd binary is automatically executed during standard git operations. While this is a core feature of the tool's intended synchronization logic, it constitutes a form of automated persistence that users should be aware of.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:30 PM