context-orchestrator
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill templates user input directly into shell commands across several files.
- Evidence:
commands/context.mduseslimitless workflow search "{query}".agents/limitless-agent.mduseslifelogs search "{query}".agents/research-agent.mdusesresearch docs -t "{query}". - Risk: Despite a mention of 'FIXED' in the included
docs/SECURITY-REVIEW.md, the YAML definitions still show direct string interpolation. A malicious user could provide a query like; rm -rf / ;to execute arbitrary system commands. - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): High surface area for Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion Points:
research-agent.md(online documentation, academic papers, Perplexity/Exa results),limitless-agent.md(personal chat transcripts/recordings), andpieces-agent.md(local code history). - Boundary Markers: Absent. Ingested data is merged into the agent's context without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability Inventory: The agent can execute system commands via the three CLI tools and read/write to the cache directory (
~/.claude/.context-cache/). - Sanitization: None detected for content returned from external sources. Malicious content in a searched webpage or a poisoned transcript could redirect the agent's behavior.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The skill relies on external binaries from non-standard or user-controlled paths.
- Evidence:
skill.yamlreferences~/.local/bin/research,/opt/homebrew/bin/pieces, and a bun alias pointing to~/Projects/limitless-cli/bin/limitless.ts. - Risk: These dependencies are unverifiable and their integrity is not checked by the skill during runtime execution.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (MEDIUM): The skill handles highly sensitive personal data including transcripts of conversations and local code history.
- Risk:
docs/SECURITY-REVIEW.md(Finding 4) explicitly notes that the history log stores full extraction results without encryption or redaction, posing a significant data exposure risk if the machine or the agent context is compromised.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata