autonomous-common

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection in the hooks/verify-completion.sh script.
  • Ingestion points: Pull request comment bodies are retrieved from GitHub using the gh api graphql command in hooks/verify-completion.sh.
  • Boundary markers: The retrieved comment text is interpolated directly into the systemMessage field of the hook's JSON response without any delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including the ability to modify files, commit changes, and interact with the GitHub API across multiple scripts.
  • Sanitization: The script performs basic truncation by only including the first 80 characters of the comment, which reduces the potential for long payloads but does not prevent concise injection attempts.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on a suite of shell scripts to manage Git operations and GitHub interactions. While the scripts demonstrate security best practices—such as using jq with argument binding (--arg), sanitizing identifiers with sed, and passing variables to awk via ENVIRON—the inherent complexity of shell-based command assembly for tool inputs presents a surface for potential execution issues if sanitization is bypassed.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 16, 2026, 05:23 AM