content-factory
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive browser session files and cookie stores (e.g.,
~/.playwright-data/xiaohongshu/state.jsonand~/.xiaohongshu/cookies.json) to perform automated actions. While intended for the primary purpose of auto-publishing, this represents high-privilege data access. Furthermore, the skill hardcodes a specific Telegram chat ID (8518085684) as the recipient for draft reviews and topic cards inscripts/draft_reviewer.pyandscripts/topic_presenter.py, which would send user data to the author's account by default. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its ingestion of untrusted data from 10+ external social platforms without sanitization.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/aggregator/fetch_all.pyscrapes titles, summaries, and descriptions from platforms including Weibo, 知乎, GitHub, Reddit, and LinuxDo. - Boundary markers: Absent; scraped content is interpolated directly into LLM prompts in
scripts/topic_scorer.pyandscripts/content_generator.pywithout clear delimiters. - Capability inventory: Subprocess command execution, automated social media publishing (
scripts/auto_publisher.py), and Telegram messaging. - Sanitization: Absent; content is passed to LLMs as raw text strings.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts utilize
subprocess.runto execute system binaries, includingcurlfor networking,pkillfor browser management, and thepasspassword manager for credential retrieval. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The aggregator fetches data from numerous external domains and APIs, including Viki.moe, Bilibili, GitHub, Reddit, and WeChat/Sogou search.
Audit Metadata