humanize-korean-ai-text

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 28, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download external code and resources from the repository https://github.com/epoko77-ai/im-not-ai.git and a plugin from a third-party fork (humanize-korean@epoko77-ai-plugins). These are used for the initial setup and expansion of the skill's capabilities.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation in SKILL.md mentions the execution of a shell script (./scripts/install.sh) during the installation process. It also utilizes commands like /humanize and /humanize-redo which perform file system operations, specifically reading user inputs and writing results to a local _workspace/ directory.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) as it is designed to ingest and process untrusted text provided by the user.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent's context in SKILL.md through direct text input or file paths provided to the /humanize command.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions in SKILL.md do not specify any delimiters or safety warnings to prevent the agent from being influenced by instructions embedded within the user-provided text.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has permissions (as described in SKILL.md) to read local files and write output files to the _workspace/ directory, which could be exploited if an injection occurs.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence in SKILL.md of input validation or sanitization being applied to the text before it is processed by the rewriting agents.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 28, 2026, 08:04 PM