humanize-korean-ai-text
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download external code and resources from the repository
https://github.com/epoko77-ai/im-not-ai.gitand a plugin from a third-party fork (humanize-korean@epoko77-ai-plugins). These are used for the initial setup and expansion of the skill's capabilities. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation in
SKILL.mdmentions the execution of a shell script (./scripts/install.sh) during the installation process. It also utilizes commands like/humanizeand/humanize-redowhich perform file system operations, specifically reading user inputs and writing results to a local_workspace/directory. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) as it is designed to ingest and process untrusted text provided by the user.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent's context in
SKILL.mdthrough direct text input or file paths provided to the/humanizecommand. - Boundary markers: The instructions in
SKILL.mddo not specify any delimiters or safety warnings to prevent the agent from being influenced by instructions embedded within the user-provided text. - Capability inventory: The agent has permissions (as described in
SKILL.md) to read local files and write output files to the_workspace/directory, which could be exploited if an injection occurs. - Sanitization: There is no evidence in
SKILL.mdof input validation or sanitization being applied to the text before it is processed by the rewriting agents.
Audit Metadata