article-extractor
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- Command Execution (HIGH): The skill interpolates the user-provided
ARTICLE_URLdirectly into shell commands such asreader "$ARTICLE_URL",trafilatura --URL "$ARTICLE_URL", andcurl -s "$ARTICLE_URL". Even with double quotes, shell command substitution (e.g., using backticks or $(...)) within the URL can lead to arbitrary code execution if the input is not strictly validated. - External Downloads (MEDIUM): The installation logic encourages the agent to run
npm install -gandpip3 installfor dependencies. This modifies the global environment and introduces risks associated with third-party package managers and potential supply chain attacks if the environment is shared or sensitive. - Dynamic Execution (MEDIUM): The fallback method uses
python3 -cto execute multi-line Python scripts generated at runtime. While the script itself is hardcoded in the skill, the pattern of executing arbitrary code via CLI flags is a known risk factor. - Indirect Prompt Injection (LOW): This skill is highly susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from external URLs.
- Ingestion points: Data is fetched via
curl,reader, ortrafilaturafrom an externalARTICLE_URL(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None. Extracted content is saved directly to a file and then previewed in the agent's context without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
BashandWritetools, allowing for file system modification and further command execution. - Sanitization: No sanitization is performed on the extracted article content before it is displayed as a preview to the agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata