markitdown
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): Instructions in
INSTALLATION_GUIDE.mdandOPENROUTER_INTEGRATION.mddirect users to append environment variables to shell configuration files (~/.bashrc,~/.zshrc) usingechocommands. This constitutes a persistence mechanism that modifies the user's shell environment. - REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The skill supports a plugin architecture through the
enable_pluginsparameter inMarkItDownand utility scripts likebatch_convert.py. The documentation (api_reference.md) encourages users to search GitHub for third-party plugins, creating a risk for supply chain attacks through unverified code execution. - PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through document processing. 1. Ingestion points: Untrusted content from PDFs, transcripts, and HTML is ingested via
md.convert()inbatch_convert.py,convert_with_ai.py, andconvert_literature.py. 2. Boundary markers: The scripts wrap output in Markdown frontmatter but do not include explicit 'ignore embedded instruction' warnings for the downstream LLM. 3. Capability inventory:convert_with_ai.pysends extracted content to an LLM for analysis and description generation. 4. Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of instruction-like strings is performed on the ingested content. - EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (LOW): The skill requires downloading packages from PyPI and supports cloning from GitHub. Per [TRUST-SCOPE-RULE], these are downgraded to LOW severity as they target verified Microsoft and OpenRouter repositories.
Audit Metadata