skills/fairchild/dotclaude/fork/Gen Agent Trust Hub

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 26, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically constructs Bash commands using user-provided arguments like <branch> and <ref>. If a user provides a malicious branch name containing shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, &, |), it could lead to arbitrary command execution during the execution of the wt command or during context handoff preparation.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In Background mode, the skill executes a background process where the log redirection path is constructed using the user-provided branch name (/tmp/fork-<branch>.log). This provides an additional vector for command injection or unauthorized file system writes via shell redirection.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an indirect prompt injection surface when generating the session handoff.
  • Ingestion points: Session history components (Current Task, Progress, Decisions) are extracted from the current conversation and stored in a file named handoff.md (or .context/handoff.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the handoff uses standard Markdown headers but lacks explicit safety delimiters or instructions to the receiving agent to treat the data as untrusted.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses a Bash tool to execute worktree commands and file operations, alongside various team and task management tools (TeamCreate, TaskCreate, Task, TaskUpdate) for delegating work.
  • Sanitization: Absent; user-influenced context is interpolated directly into the handoff template without filtering for potentially malicious instructions that could manipulate the behavior of the newly spawned agent session.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 26, 2026, 02:19 AM