ln-014-agent-instructions-manager
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill reads from
~/.claude/settings.json, which is a sensitive global configuration file. This file contains the agent's environment settings and information about enabled plugins. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill has the capability to modify the agent's operating environment by updating
~/.claude/settings.jsonto disable plugins that are not from the vendor's marketplace. Although it includes a user confirmation step, the ability to programmatically alter agent settings and disable other software components constitutes a significant configuration management capability. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an indirect prompt injection surface through its file generation logic.
- Ingestion points: Project-specific data is ingested from
package.json(specifically thenameanddescriptionfields). - Boundary markers: None identified; the skill performs direct string replacement of templates placeholders like
{{PROJECT_DESCRIPTION}}and{{PROJECT_NAME}}. - Capability inventory: The skill writes the interpolated content directly to the project's root as
AGENTS.mdandCLAUDE.md, which the agent then treats as its primary instructions. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the input strings from
package.jsonis performed before they are written to the instruction files.
Audit Metadata