jira-agile
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 20, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Data Exposure & Exfiltration] (HIGH): The Python script
scripts/bulk-create.pyreads a.envfile from the filesystem to extractJIRA_EMAILandJIRA_API_TOKEN. These credentials are used for Basic Authentication in requests to a user-configurableJIRA_BASE_URL, creating a risk of credential exposure or exfiltration if the environment variables are misdirected. - [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill uses
subprocess.runto executegit log. While the command parameters are fixed, this pattern allows the script to interact directly with the host's system binaries, which is a privileged operation. - [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from git history and uses it to populate Jira issue fields. 1. Ingestion points:
get_git_commits()reads commit messages from the local repository history. 2. Boundary markers: Absent. Untrusted commit strings are interpolated directly into the JSON body for API requests. 3. Capability inventory: The script has the capability to perform authenticated POST and GET requests to the Jira API via themake_requestfunction. 4. Sanitization: Commit summaries are truncated to 255 characters, but no escaping, validation, or structural filtering is performed on the content.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata