iterate
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Behavioral override instructions that bypass human-in-the-loop safety. The skill explicitly directs the agent to "NEVER ask 'should I continue?'" and "never ask permission to continue" (SKILL.md), aiming for indefinite autonomous operation without user oversight.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Instructions to bypass platform security controls. The skill guides the agent to suggest that users add wildcard patterns to
.claude/settings.local.json(SKILL.md). This is specifically designed to silence mandatory permission prompts for tool execution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Execution of unsanitized, user-provided shell commands. The core workflow relies on running arbitrary
VerifyandGuardcommands through the Bash tool. This creates a high-risk surface for arbitrary code execution if the configuration is influenced by malicious data. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection attack surface. The skill ingests data from external sources such as
git logandresults.tsv(SKILL.md) without boundary markers. Combined with extensive capabilities includingBashexecution andWrite/Editoperations, this creates a risk where malicious commit messages or file content could manipulate the agent's logic. (Ingestion points: git log, results.tsv; Boundary markers: absent; Capability inventory: Bash, Read, Write, Edit, Agent; Sanitization: absent).
Audit Metadata