council
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Bash tool to execute several local and external commands. It runs a provider detection script (
detect-providers.sh) to discover installed LLM tools and uses CLI commands such ascodex exec,gemini, andollama runto facilitate communication between the council members and different LLM backends. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The protocol in
SKILL.md(Step 2) uses theauto_approve=trueflag when executing thecodex exectool. This configuration allows actions requested by external AI models to be executed without human confirmation, which could be exploited to perform unauthorized operations if the model is influenced by a malicious prompt. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It ingests a user-provided
problemstatement through the/councilcommand and propagates this untrusted data to 18 different subagents and multiple external LLM provider prompts. Evidence chain: - Ingestion point: The
problemargument in the/councilinvocation. - Boundary markers: The skill uses markdown headers like 'The problem under deliberation:' in prompt templates, but lacks explicit 'ignore previous instructions' protections for the subagents.
- Capability inventory: The coordinator has the ability to execute shell commands (
bash) and interact with several external LLM providers. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of explicit input validation or sanitization of the user-provided text before it is interpolated into shell command arguments or subagent prompts.
Audit Metadata