skills/101-skills/skills/agent-tools/Gen Agent Trust Hub

agent-tools

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 11, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to download and execute a shell script from a remote URL directly in the terminal using the curl | sh pattern.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation and update processes for the belt CLI involve fetching binary files and manifests from dist.inference.sh.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The documentation describes a feature where providing a local file path (e.g., ~/.ssh/id_rsa or local media) as a model input causes the CLI to automatically upload that file to the platform's cloud servers.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of various shell commands via the belt CLI tool to perform its primary functions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Instructions for setting up shell completions involve writing configuration data to system-protected directories like /etc/bash_completion.d/, which typically requires root privileges.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface because it ingests untrusted data from the external app store and model results (Ingestion points: app-discovery.md, running-apps.md). It lacks explicit boundary markers to separate this data from instructions. The agent has the capability to execute shell commands (Capability inventory: SKILL.md), and no sanitization of the remote content is specified.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jul 11, 2026, 06:24 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — agent-tools