agent-tools
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 11, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to download and execute a shell script from a remote URL directly in the terminal using the
curl | shpattern. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation and update processes for the
beltCLI involve fetching binary files and manifests fromdist.inference.sh. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The documentation describes a feature where providing a local file path (e.g.,
~/.ssh/id_rsaor local media) as a model input causes the CLI to automatically upload that file to the platform's cloud servers. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of various shell commands via the
beltCLI tool to perform its primary functions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Instructions for setting up shell completions involve writing configuration data to system-protected directories like
/etc/bash_completion.d/, which typically requires root privileges. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface because it ingests untrusted data from the external app store and model results (Ingestion points: app-discovery.md, running-apps.md). It lacks explicit boundary markers to separate this data from instructions. The agent has the capability to execute shell commands (Capability inventory: SKILL.md), and no sanitization of the remote content is specified.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata