twitter-automation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references installation instructions and sub-skills hosted on the vendor's official GitHub repository and infrastructure.
- Evidence:
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.mdandnpx skills addcommands for vendor-owned skills. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
beltCLI tool to perform all actions, including posting tweets, sending direct messages, and managing user profiles. The use of the tool is restricted via the frontmatter to the specific CLI binary. - Evidence: Use of
belt app runfor various Twitter operations. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from an external source (Twitter/X) through tools that retrieve tweets and user profiles. This data is then available in the agent's context and could influence subsequent actions.
- Ingestion points:
x/post-getandx/user-getretrieve external content. - Boundary markers: None explicitly defined in the skill instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill can post new content (
x/post-tweet), send messages (x/dm-send), and follow users (x/user-follow) via thebeltCLI. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering of the retrieved social media content is mentioned.
Audit Metadata