302ai-api-integration

Fail

Audited by Snyk on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGH
Full Analysis

HIGH W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.

  • Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill explicitly instructs the agent to ask for the user's 302.AI API key and embed that key verbatim into generated code, headers, and examples (e.g., API_KEY in templates and Authorization headers), which forces the LLM to handle secrets in its outputs and creates an exfiltration risk.

MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

  • Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill automatically downloads and parses public API documentation (scripts/parse_api_list.py fetches https://doc.302.ai/llms.txt) and then uses WebFetch to retrieve user-selected API doc links, meaning the agent reads and interprets external public third-party content as part of its workflow.

MEDIUM W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).

  • Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.80). The skill's runtime explicitly auto-fetches the API list from https://doc.302.ai/llms.txt (and then WebFetches selected docs like https://doc.302.ai/<doc_id>.md) to inject remote documentation into the agent's context and drive prompt interpretation and generated code, making these URLs required runtime dependencies that directly control the agent's behavior.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 03:58 AM