github-actions-nx
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
assets/renderable-job.ymltemplate contains a shell command injection vulnerability where the variable${{ matrix.mmd }}is directly interpolated into a shell script block (run: | MMD="${{ matrix.mmd }}"). Since this variable is populated with file paths detected from the repository inassets/affected-job.yml, an attacker could trigger arbitrary code execution on the runner by committing a file with a malicious name (e.g.,$(whoami).mmd). - Ingestion points: File names are retrieved via
git diffand passed to the matrix output inassets/affected-job.yml. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are used to isolate the matrix variable in the shell script.
- Capability inventory: The runner executes shell commands using the variable in
assets/renderable-job.yml. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping is performed on the file paths before interpolation into the
runscript. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes third-party GitHub Actions from non-trusted sources, specifically
nrwl/nx-set-shas@v4andgeekyeggo/delete-artifact@v5. These actions represent external dependencies that should be reviewed for security or pinned to immutable SHAs to prevent supply chain attacks. - [SAFE]: The skill correctly uses official and trusted GitHub Actions including
actions/checkout@v4,actions/setup-node@v4,actions/setup-go@v5,actions/upload-artifact@v4, andactions/download-artifact@v4.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata