agent-browser

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 9, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill documents the --allow-file-access flag, which enables the browser to read sensitive files from the local filesystem using file:// URLs.
  • Evidence: Found in SKILL.md and references/commands.md which describe opening local files and PDFs via this flag.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill supports executing arbitrary JavaScript at runtime, including support for Base64-encoded scripts which can be used to bypass static analysis of the logic being executed.
  • Evidence: references/commands.md defines the eval command with -b/--base64 and --stdin options.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from external websites and uses it in the agent context without sanitization.
  • Ingestion points: element text and page content extracted via snapshot and get text in SKILL.md and templates/capture-workflow.sh.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the provided templates.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can write files (templates/capture-workflow.sh), navigate the network, and execute browser interactions through the agent-browser subprocess.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the extracted web content is performed before processing.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing a series of CLI commands for browser control and automation.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md and references/commands.md provide an extensive list of browser interaction commands.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 9, 2026, 10:10 PM