personalization-memory

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 7, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface and Reduced User Oversight.
  • Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data from interaction trajectories, git logs, and diffs via references/trajectory-scanner.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit structural delimiters or boundary markers mandated for the external data ingested by the scanner, which could allow malicious content in logs to influence preference synthesis.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes Write, Edit, and Bash tools to update memory files that persist across sessions and influence agent behavior.
  • Sanitization: The instructions require the agent to paraphrase and summarize inputs rather than quoting them directly, providing a basic level of filtering.
  • Oversight: SKILL.md and references/writeback-policy.md explicitly instruct the agent to perform "automatic writeback" and "do not ask the user" for routine preferences, reducing the opportunity for human verification of newly learned behaviors.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Access to sensitive configuration and memory paths.
  • Evidence: The skill is designed to read from and write to ~/.codex/memories/, which may contain private user data.
  • Mitigation: The skill includes strong negative constraints in SKILL.md prohibiting the storage of credentials, raw private conversations, or local-only paths.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Execution of shell commands for repository analysis.
  • Evidence: references/trajectory-scanner.md uses Bash to execute git diff and git log --stat to identify workflow changes.
  • Risk: These are standard operations for the skill's purpose, but the use of shell tools over untrusted repository state represents a standard security surface.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 7, 2026, 11:43 AM