personalization-memory
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface and Reduced User Oversight.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data from interaction trajectories, git logs, and diffs via
references/trajectory-scanner.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit structural delimiters or boundary markers mandated for the external data ingested by the scanner, which could allow malicious content in logs to influence preference synthesis.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Write,Edit, andBashtools to update memory files that persist across sessions and influence agent behavior. - Sanitization: The instructions require the agent to paraphrase and summarize inputs rather than quoting them directly, providing a basic level of filtering.
- Oversight:
SKILL.mdandreferences/writeback-policy.mdexplicitly instruct the agent to perform "automatic writeback" and "do not ask the user" for routine preferences, reducing the opportunity for human verification of newly learned behaviors. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Access to sensitive configuration and memory paths.
- Evidence: The skill is designed to read from and write to
~/.codex/memories/, which may contain private user data. - Mitigation: The skill includes strong negative constraints in
SKILL.mdprohibiting the storage of credentials, raw private conversations, or local-only paths. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Execution of shell commands for repository analysis.
- Evidence:
references/trajectory-scanner.mdusesBashto executegit diffandgit log --statto identify workflow changes. - Risk: These are standard operations for the skill's purpose, but the use of shell tools over untrusted repository state represents a standard security surface.
Audit Metadata