hass-builder
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The wrapper script
scripts/hab.shis designed to download platform-specific binaries for the 'hab' CLI from a GitHub repository (github.com/balloob/home-assistant-build-cli). - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the downloaded binary file directly using the
execcommand within the bash script. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The script performs a permission modification using
chmod +xon the binary downloaded at runtime to the user's cache directory (~/.cache/hab-cli). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands such as
curl,wget, andchmodto facilitate the installation and execution of the external CLI tool. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes state and configuration data from an external Home Assistant instance, creating a potential attack surface.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through commands like
hab entity list,hab entity get, and various dashboard or automation schema inspection commands. - Boundary markers: The skill relies on JSON envelopes for structured output but lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore instructions embedded within Home Assistant configuration fields.
- Capability inventory: The
habtool possesses significant capabilities, including the ability to restart the system, delete backups, and modify network settings. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the data retrieved from Home Assistant is documented before processing.
Audit Metadata