mcp-deepwiki
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 26, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs shell commands using
npx -y mcporterwhere user-controlled inputs (repoNameandquestion) are interpolated into the command string. This pattern is highly susceptible to command injection if the agent environment executes these strings via a shell, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary system commands by including characters like;,&, or backticks in the input. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
npx -y mcporterto fetch and execute themcporterutility from the public npm registry at runtime. This creates a dependency on external, unvetted code that is not hosted by a trusted organization. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted documentation content from GitHub repositories, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. Ingestion points: Tools like
read_wiki_contentsandask_questionfetch external text from any GitHub repository. Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are provided to the agent to distinguish between its instructions and the retrieved documentation content. Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands and interact with a remote MCP server. Sanitization: There is no indication that the content retrieved from repositories is sanitized or filtered before being passed to the AI for processing.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata