zai-tts
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
uvxcommand-line utility to execute thezai-ttstool. This involves spawning subprocesses with parameters like{msg},{tempdir}, and{filename}. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The use of
uvximplies that thezai-ttspackage is downloaded from an external registry (such as PyPI) and executed in an ephemeral environment at runtime. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it interpolates untrusted user input
{msg}directly into a shell command string:uvx zai-tts -t "{msg}". - Ingestion points: User-provided text is captured in the
{msg}variable and file paths are captured in{tempdir}and{filename}. - Boundary markers: While the variable is wrapped in double quotes, there is no evidence of shell-safe escaping or sanitization logic to prevent an attacker from using shell metacharacters (e.g., backticks, semicolons, or command substitution) to escape the string and execute arbitrary commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands and write files to the local system.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the input variables is specified in the skill definition.
Audit Metadata