setup-guide
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 9, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is configured with the
Bashtool and directs the agent to execute shell commands derived from the project files it is analyzing to "verify each step works." - Evidence: The markdown body contains the instruction: "Don't just read the README — actually verify each step works on the current system," and provides templates for executing arbitrary commands found in the repo (e.g.,
npm run dev,python manage.py migrate). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes content from a variety of untrusted files as instructions for its workflow.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
package.json,.env.example,docker-compose.yml,README.md, and other project-specific configuration files (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions to the agent to treat the content of these external files as untrusted data or to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows the use of
Bash,Read,Grep, andGlobtools, providing a powerful execution environment for any instructions injected via project files. - Sanitization: None. The skill does not describe any methods for validating or escaping the strings retrieved from the filesystem before they are used in commands.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill automates the use of package managers that download and execute code from public registries based on potentially malicious configuration files.
- Evidence: The workflow includes automated steps for
npm install,pip install,composer install, andbundle install, which fetch dependencies from external sources without prior verification of the repository's integrity.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata