Nostr Crypto Guide

Overview

Implement Nostr's cryptographic primitives correctly. This skill covers the five crypto-related NIPs that agents consistently get wrong: key derivation (NIP-06), payload encryption (NIP-44), gift wrapping for metadata privacy (NIP-59), private key encryption for backup (NIP-49), and remote signing (NIP-46).

When to Use

• The task centers on Nostr cryptographic operations such as NIP-06, NIP-44, NIP-46, NIP-49, or NIP-59.
• The user needs help with key derivation, encryption/decryption, gift wrap, private-key protection, or remote-signing crypto flows.
• The problem is cryptographic correctness, interoperability, or migration away from deprecated NIPs.
• The request is about how secrets or ciphertext are produced and consumed inside a Nostr app.

Do NOT use when:

• The task is event tagging or JSON construction.
• The work is relay protocol, filters, or subscription handling.
• The question is generic secp256k1 theory unrelated to Nostr workflows.

Response format

Always structure the final response with these top-level sections, in this order:

1. Summary — state the task, scope, and main conclusion in 1-3 sentences.
2. Decision / Approach — state the key classification, assumptions, or chosen path.
3. Artifacts — provide the primary deliverable(s) for this skill. Use clear subheadings for multiple files, commands, JSON payloads, queries, or documents.
4. Validation — state checks performed, important risks, caveats, or unresolved questions.
5. Next steps — list concrete follow-up actions, or write None if nothing remains.

Rules:

• Do not omit a section; write None when a section does not apply.
• If files are produced, list each file path under Artifacts before its contents.
• If commands, JSON, SQL, YAML, or code are produced, put each artifact in fenced code blocks with the correct language tag when possible.
• Keep section names exactly as written above so output stays predictable across skills.

Workflow

1. Identify the Crypto Operation

Ask: "What cryptographic operation does the developer need?"

Intent	NIP	Key Function
Encrypt a message between two users	NIP-44	conversation_key + encrypt
Send a private DM with metadata privacy	NIP-59	rumor -> seal -> gift wrap
Encrypt a private key for backup	NIP-49	scrypt + XChaCha20-Poly1305
Derive keys from mnemonic	NIP-06	BIP39 + BIP32 derivation
Sign events without exposing privkey	NIP-46	Remote signer via kind:24133

2. NIP-06 — Key Derivation from Mnemonic

BIP39 mnemonic words produce a binary seed, then BIP32 derives the Nostr key.

Derivation path: m/44'/1237'/<account>'/0/0

• Coin type 1237 is Nostr's SLIP-44 registration
• Use account = 0 for a single identity
• Increment account for multiple identities from one seed

Steps:

1. Validate the mnemonic (12 or 24 words from BIP39 wordlist)
2. Convert mnemonic to binary seed via BIP39 (with optional passphrase)
3. Derive the private key at path m/44'/1237'/0'/0/0
4. The 32-byte private key is the Nostr secret key
5. Compute the public key via secp256k1 (x-only, 32 bytes)

Test vector:

mnemonic: leader monkey parrot ring guide accident before fence cannon height naive bean
privkey:  7f7ff03d123792d6ac594bfa67bf6d0c0ab55b6b1fdb6249303fe861f1ccba9a
pubkey:   17162c921dc4d2518f9a101db33695df1afb56ab82f5ff3e5da6eec3ca5cd917
nsec:     nsec10allq0gjx7fddtzef0ax00mdps9t2kmtrldkyjfs8l5xruwvh2dq0lhhkp
npub:     npub1zutzeysacnf9rru6zqwmxd54mud0k44tst6l70ja5mhv8jjumytsd2x7nu

3. NIP-44 — Encrypted Payloads (Version 2)

NIP-44v2 is the current standard for encrypting data between two Nostr users. It replaces NIP-04 (deprecated, insecure). See references/nip44-encryption.md for full pseudocode.

Encryption flow:

1. Conversation key (one-time per pair):

   • ECDH: shared_x = secp256k1_ecdh(privkey_a, pubkey_b) (unhashed 32-byte x-coordinate)
   • conversation_key = hkdf_extract(sha256, IKM=shared_x, salt="nip44-v2")
   • Symmetric: conv(a, B) == conv(b, A)

2. Per-message encryption:

   • Generate 32-byte random nonce (CSPRNG, never reuse)
   • hkdf_expand(conversation_key, nonce, 76) -> chacha_key(32) | chacha_nonce(12) | hmac_key(32)
   • Pad plaintext: power-of-2 scheme, min 32 bytes, max 65535 bytes
   • Encrypt padded plaintext with ChaCha20
   • MAC: hmac_sha256(hmac_key, nonce || ciphertext)
   • Output: base64(version_byte(0x02) || nonce(32) || ciphertext || mac(32))

3. Decryption:

   • CRITICAL: Validate the outer event's signature BEFORE decrypting
   • Decode base64, extract version + nonce + ciphertext + mac
   • Recompute conversation key and message keys
   • Verify MAC (constant-time comparison)
   • Decrypt with ChaCha20, remove padding

Padding algorithm:

calc_padded_len(unpadded_len):
  if unpadded_len <= 32: return 32
  next_power = 1 << (floor(log2(unpadded_len - 1)) + 1)
  chunk = 32 if next_power <= 256 else next_power / 8
  return chunk * (floor((unpadded_len - 1) / chunk) + 1)

Padded format: [plaintext_length: u16_be][plaintext][zero_padding]

4. NIP-59 — Gift Wrap (Privacy Layer)

Three nested layers provide metadata privacy for messages. See references/gift-wrap-flow.md for the complete flow with code examples.

Layer 1 — Rumor (unsigned event):

• The actual content (e.g., a kind:1 message)
• Has id and pubkey but NO sig
• Deniable: cannot be verified if leaked

Layer 2 — Seal (kind:13):

• content: rumor encrypted with NIP-44 to recipient's pubkey
• Signed by the real author
• Tags MUST be empty ([])
• created_at SHOULD be randomized (up to 2 days in past)
• Reveals: who signed it. Hides: content, recipient

Layer 3 — Gift Wrap (kind:1059):

• content: seal encrypted with NIP-44 using a random ephemeral key
• Signed by the random ephemeral key (one-time use)
• Tags: [["p", "<recipient_pubkey>"]] for routing
• created_at SHOULD be randomized (up to 2 days in past)
• Reveals: recipient (via p-tag). Hides: author, content

Construction steps:

1. Create rumor = { kind, content, tags, pubkey: author, created_at }
   Compute id = sha256(serialize(rumor))
   Do NOT sign

2. Create seal = {
     kind: 13,
     content: nip44_encrypt(JSON.stringify(rumor), author_privkey, recipient_pubkey),
     created_at: random_past_timestamp(),
     tags: [],
     pubkey: author_pubkey
   }
   Sign seal with author_privkey

3. Generate ephemeral_key = random_keypair()
   Create wrap = {
     kind: 1059,
     content: nip44_encrypt(JSON.stringify(seal), ephemeral_privkey, recipient_pubkey),
     created_at: random_past_timestamp(),
     tags: [["p", recipient_pubkey]],
     pubkey: ephemeral_pubkey
   }
   Sign wrap with ephemeral_privkey

4. Send wrap to recipient's relays. Discard ephemeral_key.

Unwrapping (recipient):

1. Decrypt wrap.content with NIP-44 using (recipient_privkey, wrap.pubkey)
   -> seal (JSON)
2. Verify seal.sig against seal.pubkey
3. Decrypt seal.content with NIP-44 using (recipient_privkey, seal.pubkey)
   -> rumor (JSON)
4. Verify rumor.pubkey matches seal.pubkey (author consistency)
5. rumor.content is the actual message

5. NIP-49 — Private Key Encryption (ncryptsec)

Encrypt a Nostr private key with a password for safe backup/export.

Encryption steps:

1. Normalize password to NFKC unicode form
2. Generate 16 random bytes for salt
3. Choose log_n (scrypt cost parameter):
   • 16 = 64 MiB, ~100ms (minimum recommended)
   • 20 = 1 GiB, ~2s (good default)
   • 22 = 4 GiB (high security)
4. Derive symmetric key: scrypt(password_nfkc, salt, log_n, r=8, p=1) -> 32 bytes
5. Generate 24-byte random nonce
6. Set key security byte:
   • 0x00 = key was handled insecurely (copy/paste, stored plaintext)
   • 0x01 = key was handled securely
   • 0x02 = unknown/untracked
7. Encrypt: XChaCha20-Poly1305(plaintext=privkey_32bytes, aad=key_security_byte, nonce, key=symmetric_key)
8. Concatenate: version(0x02) || log_n || salt(16) || nonce(24) || aad(1) || ciphertext(48)
   • Total: 91 bytes before bech32 encoding
9. Encode: bech32("ncryptsec", concatenated_bytes)

Decryption:

1. Decode bech32 with "ncryptsec" prefix
2. Parse: version, log_n, salt, nonce, key_security_byte, ciphertext
3. Normalize password to NFKC
4. Derive key: scrypt(password_nfkc, salt, log_n, r=8, p=1)
5. Decrypt: XChaCha20-Poly1305(ciphertext, aad=key_security_byte, nonce, key)
6. Result is the 32-byte private key

Test vector:

ncryptsec: ncryptsec1qgg9947rlpvqu76pj5ecreduf9jxhselq2nae2kghhvd5g7dgjtcxfqtd67p9m0w57lspw8gsq6yphnm8623nsl8xn9j4jdzz84zm3frztj3z7s35vpzmqf6ksu8r89qk5z2zxfmu5gv8th8wclt0h4p
password: nostr
log_n: 16
privkey: 3501454135014541350145413501453fefb02227e449e57cf4d3a3ce05378683

6. NIP-46 — Remote Signing

Remote signing keeps the private key on a dedicated signer (hardware device, server, mobile app) while the client application never sees it.

Architecture:

Client App  <--kind:24133 (NIP-44 encrypted)--> Remote Signer (has privkey)
            via Nostr relays

Connection flow:

1. Client generates a disposable client_keypair
2. Connection established via one of:
   • bunker://<remote-signer-pubkey>?relay=wss://...&secret=<optional> (signer-initiated, client sends connect request)
   • nostrconnect://<client-pubkey>?relay=wss://...&secret=<required>&name=... (client-initiated, signer sends connect response)
3. All messages are kind:24133 events, content encrypted with NIP-44
4. Client calls get_public_key to learn the user's actual pubkey

Request format (kind:24133):

{
  "kind": 24133,
  "pubkey": "<client_pubkey>",
  "content": "<nip44_encrypted({id, method, params})>",
  "tags": [["p", "<remote_signer_pubkey>"]]
}

Available methods:

Method	Params	Result
connect	[remote_signer_pubkey, secret?, perms?]	"ack" or secret
sign_event	[json_stringified_unsigned_event]	json_stringified(signed)
ping	[]	"pong"
get_public_key	[]	<user_pubkey_hex>
nip44_encrypt	[third_party_pubkey, plaintext]	<ciphertext>
nip44_decrypt	[third_party_pubkey, ciphertext]	<plaintext>

Key distinction: remote-signer-pubkey (used for NIP-44 transport encryption) may differ from user-pubkey (the actual identity that signs events). Always call get_public_key after connecting.

Common Mistakes

Mistake	Fix
Using NIP-04 for new implementations	NIP-04 is deprecated. Always use NIP-44v2 for encryption
Hashing the ECDH shared point	NIP-44 uses the raw unhashed x-coordinate. Some libraries (libsecp256k1) hash by default — use secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul or equivalent
Reusing nonces in NIP-44	Every message MUST use a fresh 32-byte CSPRNG nonce. Reuse makes messages decryptable
Adding tags to kind:13 seal events	Seal tags MUST always be empty []. Tags on the seal leak metadata
Signing the rumor in NIP-59	Rumors are intentionally unsigned for deniability. Only compute the id, never sign
Using real timestamps on seal/wrap	Both seal and gift wrap created_at SHOULD be randomized (up to 2 days in past) to prevent timing analysis
Skipping signature validation before NIP-44 decrypt	ALWAYS validate the outer event signature before decrypting content
Not normalizing password to NFKC in NIP-49	Passwords MUST be NFKC-normalized for cross-platform compatibility
Confusing remote-signer-pubkey with user-pubkey in NIP-46	They may differ. Always call get_public_key after connect
Using wrong derivation path for NIP-06	Path is m/44'/1237'/<account>'/0/0. Coin type 1237, not 0 or other values

Quick Reference

Operation	Algorithm	Key Output
NIP-44 conversation key	ECDH + HKDF-extract(sha256, salt="nip44-v2")	32-byte symmetric key
NIP-44 message keys	HKDF-expand(conv_key, nonce, 76)	chacha_key(32) + chacha_nonce(12) + hmac_key(32)
NIP-44 encrypt	ChaCha20 + HMAC-SHA256(nonce as AAD)	base64(0x02 || nonce || ciphertext || mac)
NIP-49 key derivation	scrypt(password_nfkc, salt, log_n, r=8, p=1)	32-byte symmetric key
NIP-49 encrypt	XChaCha20-Poly1305(privkey, aad=security_byte)	bech32("ncryptsec", 91 bytes)
NIP-06 key derivation	BIP39 mnemonic -> BIP32 m/44'/1237'/0'/0/0	32-byte secp256k1 privkey
NIP-59 seal	kind:13, NIP-44 encrypt rumor, empty tags	Signed by real author
NIP-59 gift wrap	kind:1059, NIP-44 encrypt seal, p-tag recipient	Signed by ephemeral key
NIP-46 transport	kind:24133, NIP-44 encrypted JSON-RPC	Request/response via relays

Key Principles

1. Validate before decrypt — Always verify the outer event's Schnorr signature before attempting NIP-44 decryption. Decrypting unverified payloads is a security vulnerability.

2. Never reuse nonces — NIP-44 nonces must be 32 bytes from a CSPRNG, unique per message. NIP-49 nonces must be 24 bytes, unique per encryption. Nonce reuse breaks confidentiality.

3. Layers isolate metadata — NIP-59's three layers each reveal exactly one piece of information: the rumor reveals content (but is deniable), the seal reveals the author (but not content or recipient), the gift wrap reveals the recipient (but not author or content). Never collapse or skip layers.

4. Conversation keys are symmetric — conv(a, B) == conv(b, A). Compute once per user pair and cache if needed. The ECDH output must NOT be hashed before HKDF — NIP-44 uses the raw x-coordinate.

5. Normalize passwords — NIP-49 requires NFKC unicode normalization of passwords before use in scrypt. Without this, the same password typed on different systems produces different keys.