tencentcloud-tke

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses subprocess.run in scripts/tke.py and documentation in SKILL.md to execute kubectl commands. The implementation in the script uses a list for the command arguments, which prevents shell injection vulnerabilities.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation instructs the installation of tencentcloud-sdk-python and the kubectl binary. These are official tools and libraries from well-known sources for the stated functionality.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates the retrieval of TKE kubeconfig files, which contain sensitive authentication tokens. While the script handles these by writing to local temporary files or user-specified paths, the documentation correctly notes that these should be treated as credentials with restricted file permissions.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it retrieves and processes untrusted data from a Kubernetes cluster (such as pod names, event messages, and application logs) and provides this content to the agent context.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the context via kubectl get and kubectl logs commands executed in scripts/tke.py and referenced in SKILL.md workflows.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore potentially malicious content embedded within the cluster data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to modify cluster state through scale and restart operations, and can write to the local file system.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the output received from cluster API calls before it is returned to the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 6, 2026, 12:51 PM