tencentcloud-tke
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runinscripts/tke.pyand documentation inSKILL.mdto executekubectlcommands. The implementation in the script uses a list for the command arguments, which prevents shell injection vulnerabilities. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation instructs the installation of
tencentcloud-sdk-pythonand thekubectlbinary. These are official tools and libraries from well-known sources for the stated functionality. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates the retrieval of TKE
kubeconfigfiles, which contain sensitive authentication tokens. While the script handles these by writing to local temporary files or user-specified paths, the documentation correctly notes that these should be treated as credentials with restricted file permissions. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it retrieves and processes untrusted data from a Kubernetes cluster (such as pod names, event messages, and application logs) and provides this content to the agent context.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via
kubectl getandkubectl logscommands executed inscripts/tke.pyand referenced inSKILL.mdworkflows. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore potentially malicious content embedded within the cluster data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to modify cluster state through
scaleandrestartoperations, and can write to the local file system. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the output received from cluster API calls before it is returned to the agent.
Audit Metadata