create-anyone
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to access and read highly sensitive local files, specifically targeting the macOS iMessage database at
~/Library/Messages/chat.db. It also instructs the agent to process other private communication archives like WeChat databases, which exposes private data to the AI context. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use the
npxcommand to download and execute theopenpersonaCLI tool and other skill management tools from the npm registry at runtime. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Dependencies and tools are fetched from external sources at runtime via
npxand potentiallygit cloneduring the installation and generation phases. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
Bashtool to execute local Python scripts (preprocess.py,skill_writer.py,version_manager.py) and external command-line utilities likenpx. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a significant surface for indirect prompt injection. It ingests raw, untrusted data from sources such as chat exports, social media archives, and web search results. This content is processed without boundary markers or sanitization, allowing malicious instructions hidden within the source material to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context via the
Readtool (local exports/files) and theWebSearchtool (public figure research). - Boundary markers: Instructions do not define specific delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded commands when processing these external data sources.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
Bash(for executing code), andWrite/Edit(for modifying the local filesystem). - Sanitization: The instructions recommend redacting PII but do not provide mechanisms for filtering or escaping potential instructions embedded in the processed text.
Audit Metadata