domain-embedded
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The file
SKILL.mdcontains the commandcat .cargo/config.toml 2>/dev/null || echo "No .cargo/config.toml found"using the!commandsyntax. This mechanism automatically executes the command at skill load time to provide the AI agent with the project's target configuration and build environment details. This is a standard and benign use case for developer-oriented tools. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests external project data into the agent's context, creating a potential surface for indirect instructions if the project file is maliciously crafted.
- Ingestion points: The contents of
.cargo/config.tomlare injected into theProject Contextsection ofSKILL.mdvia a dynamic shell command. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions telling the model to ignore potential commands within the injected file content.
- Capability inventory: The skill itself does not define any additional executable scripts, high-privilege tool access, or network capabilities.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the content of the configuration file before it is presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata