desktop-framework-tauri
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents how to build applications that ingest and process untrusted external data, which is an inherent attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the application context via the file system (
tauri-plugin-fs), network requests (tauri-plugin-http), and IPC calls (invoke). - Boundary markers: The instructions mandate the use of Tauri 2.x Capability files to restrict access and Content Security Policy (CSP) to limit webview execution.
- Capability inventory: The skill describes capabilities for file writing, shell execution, and network operations across all examples.
- Sanitization: The skill relies on standard Rust serialization (
serde) for IPC, but final data sanitization logic is left to the developer implementation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for using the
tauri-plugin-shellto execute external processes. This is documented with critical security warnings to avoid unscoped execution and to explicitly list allowed commands and arguments. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external resources for configuration and services.
- It fetches a metadata schema from the author's own infrastructure on GitHub.
- It references a well-known certificate authority (DigiCert) for binary timestamping configuration.
- Documentation examples for update servers and APIs use safe
example.complaceholders. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill includes documentation for the
tauri-plugin-autostartplugin, which enables applications to launch on system login. This is a standard feature for desktop applications and is presented as an optional plugin within the official registry.
Audit Metadata