desktop-framework-tauri

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 4, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents how to build applications that ingest and process untrusted external data, which is an inherent attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: External data enters the application context via the file system (tauri-plugin-fs), network requests (tauri-plugin-http), and IPC calls (invoke).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions mandate the use of Tauri 2.x Capability files to restrict access and Content Security Policy (CSP) to limit webview execution.
  • Capability inventory: The skill describes capabilities for file writing, shell execution, and network operations across all examples.
  • Sanitization: The skill relies on standard Rust serialization (serde) for IPC, but final data sanitization logic is left to the developer implementation.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for using the tauri-plugin-shell to execute external processes. This is documented with critical security warnings to avoid unscoped execution and to explicitly list allowed commands and arguments.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external resources for configuration and services.
  • It fetches a metadata schema from the author's own infrastructure on GitHub.
  • It references a well-known certificate authority (DigiCert) for binary timestamping configuration.
  • Documentation examples for update servers and APIs use safe example.com placeholders.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The skill includes documentation for the tauri-plugin-autostart plugin, which enables applications to launch on system login. This is a standard feature for desktop applications and is presented as an optional plugin within the official registry.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 4, 2026, 01:03 PM