02-rl-reward
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to install the
py-openjudgepackage from PyPI, which is the core framework for the reward logic. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes
CodeExecutionGrader(e.g., inpointwise.md) to score programming tasks by executing the model's generated response. This involves running untrusted code generated by an AI model, which is a standard requirement for RL code-generation tasks but represents an execution surface. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a judge-based reward system that is susceptible to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted model rollouts are ingested via the
rolloutslist inpointwise.mdand thepairs_datasetinpairwise.md. - Boundary markers: Prompt templates use headers like
Query:,Response 1:, andResponse 2:to separate fields, but they lack explicit instructions for the judge LLM to disregard any commands or overrides contained within those response fields. - Capability inventory: The system possesses capabilities including arbitrary code execution (via
CodeExecutionGrader) and network access for LLM judging (viaOpenAIChatModeltargeting the Alibaba DashScope API). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input sanitization or escaping to prevent adversarial content in a rollout from influencing the reward score.
Audit Metadata