Ansible Playbook Debugger
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill identifies an indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8). It is designed to ingest and parse output from multiple external sources, including task execution results, JSON callback plugins, ansible-lint reports, and inventory files. If these sources are attacker-controlled or compromised, they could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Task execution results, structured JSON callback output, inventory files, and lint reports (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: None specified in the skill to distinguish untrusted data from instructions.
- Capability inventory: Executes subprocesses for ansible-playbook, ansible-lint, ansible-inventory, ansible-config, and ansible-vault (SKILL.md).
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of external content is described.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's core functionality involves executing a wide range of shell commands and Ansible CLI tools. This includes sensitive operations such as 'ansible-vault view', which decrypts secrets and brings them into the agent's context for analysis.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: While not hardcoding secrets, the skill explicitly facilitates the decryption of Ansible Vault secrets using 'ansible-vault view'. Users should be aware that the agent will have access to the cleartext values of any vaulted variables it is instructed to debug.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The metadata field 'verification: security_reviewed' is a self-asserted claim by the author. This may mislead users regarding the actual security posture of the skill, as it does not reflect an independent or platform-level verification.
Audit Metadata