ai-image-generation
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Fetches and executes an installation script from the vendor's official domain via a piped shell command (
https://runcomfy.com/install.sh | sh). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Recommends installing the
@runcomfy/clipackage from the official NPM registry. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Accesses the tool's local configuration file for authentication (
~/.config/runcomfy/token.json) and communicates with the vendor's official API endpoints at*.runcomfy.netand*.runcomfy.comfor model processing and file downloads. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input including text prompts and image URLs, which constitutes an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: User-supplied text and URLs enter the agent context via the
--inputflag inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Prompts are encapsulated within a structured JSON string (e.g.,
{"prompt": "..."}). - Capability inventory: The skill can execute the
runcomfyCLI tool using theBashtool as defined in the YAML frontmatter. - Sanitization: Documentation specifies that the CLI transmits the JSON body directly to the API without performing shell expansion, which mitigates standard command injection risks.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://runcomfy.com/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata