abd-proposal-respond
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/setup_response.pyusessubprocess.runto execute the Windowsmklinkcommand for creating directory junctions in the workspace. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts
scripts/build_appendix_deck.pyandscripts/split_pptx_by_section.pyutilize thewin32com.clientlibrary to perform COM automation, allowing the skill to programmatically control the Microsoft PowerPoint application on the host system to assemble and split presentation files. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted data from external proposal materials (PDFs, PPTX, etc.) through a RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) pipeline.
- Ingestion points: Reads files from directories specified via the
--proposalargument inscripts/setup_response.pyand via the Accelerator Table markdown file. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands were found in the data processing scripts.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for file system modification (creating symlinks/junctions via
setup_response.py) and local application control (PowerPoint automation viabuild_appendix_deck.pyandsplit_pptx_by_section.py). - Sanitization: Path inputs are resolved using
pathlib.Path.resolve(), but the content extracted from slides (e.g., section titles insplit_pptx_by_section.py) is used to determine logic flow without extensive sanitization.
Audit Metadata