abd-proposal-respond

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 11, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/setup_response.py uses subprocess.run to execute the Windows mklink command for creating directory junctions in the workspace.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts scripts/build_appendix_deck.py and scripts/split_pptx_by_section.py utilize the win32com.client library to perform COM automation, allowing the skill to programmatically control the Microsoft PowerPoint application on the host system to assemble and split presentation files.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted data from external proposal materials (PDFs, PPTX, etc.) through a RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) pipeline.
  • Ingestion points: Reads files from directories specified via the --proposal argument in scripts/setup_response.py and via the Accelerator Table markdown file.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands were found in the data processing scripts.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for file system modification (creating symlinks/junctions via setup_response.py) and local application control (PowerPoint automation via build_appendix_deck.py and split_pptx_by_section.py).
  • Sanitization: Path inputs are resolved using pathlib.Path.resolve(), but the content extracted from slides (e.g., section titles in split_pptx_by_section.py) is used to determine logic flow without extensive sanitization.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 11, 2026, 10:21 AM