inbox
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection via the ingestion of external data. \n
- Ingestion points: The
readandstatussubcommands ininbox.tsfetch message content from the external API endpointhttps://aibtc.com/api/inbox. \n - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are provided in
SKILL.mdorAGENT.mdto prevent the agent from executing commands embedded in the received message content. \n - Capability inventory: The agent can perform high-impact financial operations, such as sending sBTC via the
sendcommand ininbox.ts, which could be abused if the agent is manipulated by malicious message content. \n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of external message content before it is parsed and acted upon by the agent.
Audit Metadata