md2pdf

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill is designed to process external Markdown files (input.md) and custom CSS. PDF engines like WeasyPrint often interpret HTML/CSS within Markdown. If the input source is untrusted (e.g., a web page summary or user-provided file), an attacker could use tags like , , or CSS @import to read local files (e.g., /etc/passwd) or make internal network requests.
  • Ingestion Point: scripts/md2pdf.py via the input.md and --style arguments.
  • Boundary Markers: None. The skill documentation does not mention sanitizing input or using WeasyPrint's 'base_url' or 'url_fetcher' restrictions.
  • Capability Inventory: File write (output.pdf), shell execution via uv run and chmod.
  • Sanitization: None evident; the script likely passes raw content to the rendering engine.
  • Privilege Escalation (MEDIUM): The documentation instructs the user/agent to use sudo apt install and chmod +x. While common for setup, an autonomous agent executing these could compromise host security.
  • Dynamic Execution (MEDIUM): The skill claims to 'automatically configure Homebrew library paths' on macOS. This typically involves modifying DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH or similar environment variables at runtime, which can be used for library hijacking or process injection if not strictly controlled.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 12:25 PM