personal-assistant
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (LOW): The skill stores user-provided content that may contain malicious instructions, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection when the agent later reviews these tasks. \n
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via task titles and descriptions in
scripts/task_helper.py. \n - Boundary markers: Absent; the implementation lacks delimiters to distinguish user-provided data from system instructions. \n
- Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities to read and write local task data and manage schedules as defined in
scripts/task_helper.pyand referenced inreferences/assistant_capabilities.md. \n - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not perform any escaping or validation on stored task metadata.
Audit Metadata