xlsx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
recalc.pyscript executes system commands usingsubprocess.run, specifically calling thesoffice(LibreOffice) binary and thetimeout(orgtimeouton macOS) utility to manage headless spreadsheet operations. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill exhibits dynamic code generation by creating a LibreOffice Basic macro file (
Module1.xba) and saving it to the user's application configuration path (e.g.,~/.config/libreoffice/). It subsequently triggers the execution of this generated code via a specific URI scheme (vnd.sun.star.script) through the command line. While the macro source is currently hardcoded, this mechanism bypasses traditional security boundaries for office automation. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from spreadsheets (.xlsx, .csv, .tsv) which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through
pandas.read_excelandopenpyxl.load_workbookinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit instructions or delimiters are provided to the agent to treat cell contents as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands, write files to the local filesystem, and modify application configurations.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of spreadsheet content before processing or recalculation.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The script automatically writes an execution log (
executed_recalc.log) to the parent directory of the spreadsheet being processed. In shared environments, this could lead to the exposure of file paths and processing metadata to unauthorized users.
Audit Metadata