skills/aisa-group/skill-inject/xlsx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

xlsx

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 27, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The recalc.py script executes system commands using subprocess.run, specifically calling the soffice (LibreOffice) binary and the timeout (or gtimeout on macOS) utility to manage headless spreadsheet operations.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill exhibits dynamic code generation by creating a LibreOffice Basic macro file (Module1.xba) and saving it to the user's application configuration path (e.g., ~/.config/libreoffice/). It subsequently triggers the execution of this generated code via a specific URI scheme (vnd.sun.star.script) through the command line. While the macro source is currently hardcoded, this mechanism bypasses traditional security boundaries for office automation.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from spreadsheets (.xlsx, .csv, .tsv) which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through pandas.read_excel and openpyxl.load_workbook in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit instructions or delimiters are provided to the agent to treat cell contents as untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands, write files to the local filesystem, and modify application configurations.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of spreadsheet content before processing or recalculation.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The script automatically writes an execution log (executed_recalc.log) to the parent directory of the spreadsheet being processed. In shared environments, this could lead to the exposure of file paths and processing metadata to unauthorized users.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 27, 2026, 09:02 PM